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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the jurisdiction of federal courts may be controlled by act
of the state legislature or decision of the state courts. It
was stated in a case on which certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court only a few years prior to the instant case
that a state may not determine the jurisdiction of a federal
court "under the theory that the latter is required to follow
the public policy of the former."23
However, the Bullington case seems to have opened up
a new vista for the application of individual State policy
and State law-namely, the possibility that in exercising
its freedom of declaring public policy a State may secure
some indirect measure of control over the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts. The implication seems plain that the
Supreme Court has not yet arrived at the outer boundaries
of application of the Erie doctrine.
THE AMENDING OF ALIMONY AND DIVORCE CASES
IN MARYLAND
Brooks v. Brooks'
Ritz v. Ritz2
The primary object of this case note is to consider the
impact of later Maryland decisions, namely, the Brooks and
Ritz cases, on existing Maryland amendment law as devel-
oped in an earlier case noted entitled, "Proper Venue of
Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster of Jurisdiction
-Amendment-Woodcock v. Woodcock."' The amend-
ment problem in the cases being noted was brought before
the courts by unsuccessful contentions that the "Thirty
Day Rules" of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City and
of Anne Arundel County providing, "No decree in a suit
for divorce shall be passed in less than thirty days from
the filing of the bill, or on the cross-bill within thirty days
from the filing of a cross-bill.. .,"I were violated.
The right to amend will be considered in the following
situations:
23 Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 110 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940) ; certiorari granted, 310 U. S. 632 (1940) ; certiorari dismissed,
311 U. S. 720 (1940).
1 184 Md. 419, 41 A. (2d) 367 (1945).
2 52 A. (2d) 729 (Md. 1947).
1 (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 81; 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935).
4 Rules of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (1936), Rule 26.
Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Rule 670.
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(a) amending either a partial or an absolute divorce
bill to a bill for alimony alone; (b) amending a bill for
alimony alone to one for partial divorce; (c) amending a
bill for alimony alone to one for absolute divorce; (d),
amending a bill for absolute divorce to one for partial
divorce; (e) amending a bill for partial divorce to one
for absolute divorce.
As will be pointed out later, the addition of a prayer
for "further relief" to an alimony bill is of considerable
significance.
Concerning (e) above, it will be necessary to ex-
amine the two Schwab" cases and differentiate between
the two general methods of altering a bill in equity, either
by amendment or by the filing of a supplemental bill.
Before taking up the questions involved, it would be
well to review the facts and results relevant to the subject
matter of this writing in the Woodcock, Brooks and Ritz
cases.
In the Woodcock case, plaintiff-wife--appellee, filed a
bill for alimony without divorce containing a prayer for
further relief in Baltimore City, her residence, against
defendant-husband-appellant, who lived in Wicomico
County. Defendant, before appearing specially in Balti-
more City to plead to the jurisdiction (over the person),
filed a bill for divorce a mensa et thoro in Wicomico County,
claiming abandonment and desertion. The trial court in
Baltimore City concluded that a motion to quash the
service should be granted because the suit was not brought
in the defendant's jurisdiction, pursuant to the principle
that an alimony suit, being in personam, must be brought
in the county where the husband resides. Subsequently,
however, the court allowed plaintiff to amend her original
bill by an additional prayer for an a mensa divorce. Upon
appeal, the court ruled that the suit was improperly
brought in Baltimore City and the filing of the husband's
bill for an a mensa divorce in Wicomico County effectuated
an ouster of jurisdiction as against Baltimore City."
In Brooks v. Brooks, the plaintiff-wife-appellant, filed
her bill for alimony without divorce on September 22nd,
1943 in Anne Arundel County where both resided, alleging
technical desertion by virtue of his refusal to cohabitate.
1 Schwab v. Schwab, 93 Md. 382, 49 A. 331 (1901) ; Schwab v. Schwab, 96
Md. 592, 54 A. 653 (1903).
For cases on this point, see Brooks v. Delaplaine, 1 Md. Ch. 351 (1848)
Withers et al. v. Denmead, 22 Md. 135 (1864) ; Wright v. Williams, 93 Md.
66, 48 A. 397 (1901) ; Preston v. Poe, 116 Md. 1, 81 A. 178 (1911).
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Defendant-husband-appellee, denied the allegations and
filed a cross-bill on grounds of abandonment, praying an
absolute divorce. On March 2nd, 1944, plaintiff amended
her bill to divorce a vinculo and obtained a decree. The
property settlement was filed in the case, but was not
incorporated in the decree. Later, plaintiff brought two
actions to set aside the divorce decree and the property
settlement respectively, alleging, among other things, a
violation of Equity Rule No. 26 of the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County.7 The Court of Appeals decided that
"the amendment made in the case now before us on the
day the decree was filed was not necessary to enable appel-
lant to get an absolute divorce, as she had a right to one
under her original bill",8 and since the original bill was
filed more than thirty days before the date of the decree,
the aforementioned equity rule had no application.
Defendant-wife-appellee, in the Ritz case on July
16th, 1946, filed a bill for alimony alone (containing no
prayer for further relief) in the Circuit Court of Balti-
more City for desertion. Plaintiff-husband-appellant,
filed a cross-bill for an a mensa divorce. After the hearing
in the case, the Chancellor suggested that the wife amend
her bill to a divorce a mensa, which she did on October
25th, 1946. The decree granting the appellee her partial
divorce was signed on November 1st, 1946. The husband's
appeal, asserting as one of its grounds the violation of
the thirty day rule, was denied.
The first problem was considered in the case of Stewart
v. Stewart? There the court refused the wife's bill for
partial divorce for adultery, since adultery was not one
of the enumerated grounds for this type of relief, but
remanded with leave to plaintiff to amend her bill to
alimony alone without divorce, to which relief she was
entitled under her allegations. The Wald" case, which
allowed the wife to modify an a vinculo divorce decree,
granted on her cross-bill for alimony alone and further
relief, to alimony alone, states:
"Since an early date, the wife, although entitled
to a divorce, may, in this jurisdiction, elect to proceed
against the husband for alimony only, and thus she
has the choice between a suit for divorce with alimony
or for alimony without divorce. She may make this
7 Supra, n. 4.
8 184 Md. 419, 424, 41 A. (2d) 369 (1945).
S105 Md. 297, 66 A. 16 (1907).
10 Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 A. 97 (1932).
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choice either when she begins her suit, or during the
course of the litigation, or, under proper circumstances,
after an adjudication and remand on appeal."'"
The rule, therefore, based on the above decisions, is that
a bill for either type of divorce on the misconduct grounds,
may be amended either by the "amendment" method in
the Stewart case or the "choice" method permitted by the
Wald case.
The second problem, that of amending a bill for ali-
mony alone to partial divorce, is apparently well settled
in Maryland at present. However, as a result of the
holding of the Woodcock case, and its jurisdictional rami-
fications, this problem requires not only an analysis of
the amendment rule but a further treatment of the juris-
dictional question as well. In the Ritz case, which allowed
amendment from alimony alone to an a mensa divorce,
the husband appealed contending that the amendment so
suggested and permitted by the Chancellor violated the
thirty day rule and prejudiced his rights because the
decree was signed within thirty days of the amendment.
In the opinion, the court said, "As the original prayer was
for alimony alone, and as alimony will not be awarded
except on grounds which would be sufficient to grant a
divorce a mensa et thoro, the appellant should not have
been surprised, nor were his rights prejudiced. ' 12 The
court went on to say that since no substantial right of
the parties was prejudiced by the amendment, the amend-
ment should not be considered as a new bill and, there-
fore, the thirty day rule was not violated. It should be
noted, moreover, that the permitted amendment was neces-
sary in this case in order for the sought relief to be
granted, and furthermore, that the original bill of com-
plaint failed to contain the usual prayer for further relief.13
A cursory glance at the facts and results in the Wood-
cock case, which refused to allow an amendment from
alimony alone and further relief to a partial divorce, would
lead one to conclude that it was overruled by the Ritz
case, which did permit this type of amendment. However,
such a conclusion would be entirely specious, for it would
fail to take into account the fact that the husband in
the Woodcock case had accomplished an ouster of juris-
diction by filing his bill for a mensa divorce in the county
l"Ibid., 502.
1252 A. (2d) 729, 733 (1947).
13 General Equity Rule 7 states that all bills . . . shall also contain the
prayer for general relief." See also Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 176.
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of his residence. As a consequence, then, the rule seems
to be that if the suit is brought in the proper jurisdiction,
an amendment from alimony alone to a mensa will be
permitted. Since the grounds for the granting of alimony
alone and a mensa overlap, the prayer for further relief is
of no significance. The granting of the desired amendment
in the Woodcock case, it is submitted, would have been
affirmed on appeal in the absence of an ouster of jurisdic-
tion, as there would then have been no reason for the dis-
allowance of such amendment.
Our third question, whether or not an amendment from
alimony alone and further relief to a vinculo divorce will be
permitted, has been thoroughly answered in the Brooks
case. Here, although the court permitted the amendment, it
asserted that the amendment was not necessary as the
inclusion of a prayer for general relief in the original bill
automatically entitled the plaintiff-wife-to the maxi-
mum amount of relief warranted by the allegations. This
assertion is in accord with the general equity rule on the
type of relief to be granted under a prayer for general
relief, as expressed in Hill v. Pinder."4 It is evident that
in this type of amendment situation, the inclusion of a
prayer for further relief is of the utmost importance, for
if such a prayer is not included, an amendment will con-
travene the rule against making a new bill by amendment.
"Under the privilege of amending, a party is not
permitted to make a new bill; he cannot abandon the
entire case made by the bill and make a new and dif-
ferent case by way of amendment. If the amendment
proposed changes the character of the suit as orig-
inally instituted, and is inconsistent with and repug-
nant to the title set up and the relief sought by the
bill, making in substance a new bill, it cannot be
allowed."'"
As to the fourth problem, the amendment of a bill for
absolute divorce to one for partial divorce, the Maryland
Code, Article 16, Section 41, eliminates all uncertainties.
The Code provides that if, in a bill for an a vinculo divorce,
the court should find a mensa grounds, a partial divorce
may be allowed. The basis for the above rule is that every
bill for an a vinculo divorce automatically includes one for
14 150 Md. 397, 133 A. 134 (1926).
s MILLER, EQUITy PawoEwua, 'Sec. 186; see. also General Equity Rule 17
and Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 18, as amended.
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an a mensa divorce, and the need for an amendment is
thereby obviated.
The final problem to be considered, and perhaps the
one most conducive to speculation, is that of amending a
bill for a partial divorce to one for an absolute divorce, or
the employment of the supplemental bill device to accom-
plish the same result.
Miller draws the following distinction between a sup-
plemental bill and an amendment:
"The general rule is that matters which have oc-
curred previous to the filing of the original bill may
be introduced by amendment; but that nothing which
has occurred since the filing of a bill can be added to
it by amendment, but must be brought in by supple-
mental bill."116
It behooves the reader to note that this problem can
only arise in a desertion situation, the only overlapping
point of the grounds for partial and absolute divorce.
The first Schwab1 case refused a supplemental bill
praying an a vinculo divorce on adultery grounds occurring
after the filing of the original bill for partial divorce. Bas-
ing its reasoning on the nature of a supplemental bill, the
court held in effect that the supplemental bill was not
acceptable because the allegations not only failed to sup-
plement those in the original bill but framed an entirely
new cause of action. The court in the second Schwab8
case, for the same reason, refused to allow plaintiff to file
a supplemental bill for an absolute divorce as a result of
adulteries with parties other than the original particeps
criminis occurring after the original filing. There seem
to be no Maryland cases which unequivocally state that an
amendment can or cannot be made in this situation. The
first Schwab case reveals only that one cannot change an
original bill for an a mensa to one for an a vinculo divorce
by filing a supplemental bill. As pointed out in the Wood-
cock casenote, 9 the rule seemed to be that one could not
amend from a mensa to a vinculo. However, the Brooks
case which permitted an amendment from alimony and
further relief to divorce a vinculo (although it pointed
out that this amendment was not necessary as plaintiff
was entitled to an absolute divorce under her original
16 Ibid., Sec. 187.
1t Supra, n. 5.
18 Ibti .
10 Supra, n. 3.
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allegations, i. e. alimony and further relief) may well have
removed some of the uncertainty concerning this question,
and perhaps can be cited to support the view that an
amendment is permissible under such circumstances. The
foundation for the view permitting the amendment is that
all a mensa grounds also entitle one to alimony alone, and
since the Brooks case allows an amendment from alimony
alone and further relief to absolute divorce, it would follow
that an amendment from a partial to an absolute divorce
is permissible. The above problem can be distinguished
from the case of Miller v. Miller,20 which held that plain-
tiff may elect an a mensa divorce if there is over eighteen
months desertion; but if he does so, he cannot later obtain
an a vinculo divorce for the same ground.
Finally, it must be concluded that the Brooks and Ritz
cases do not fundamentally change local amendment doc-
trine, when contrasted with previous cases and statutes
on the subject. On the other hand, these cases do clarify
Maryland amendment law to the extent that a suit brought
in the proper jurisdiction may be amended or supple-
mented, as the case may be, provided a new bill is not
effectuated in the process, but a suit improperly filed in
the first instance may not be amended in the event of an
ouster of jurisdiction by the adversary.
THE INVALIDITY OF UNRECORDED LEASES CON-
TAINING AN AUTOMATIC RENEWAL CLAUSE,
WHERE LEASE AND RENEWALS MAY EX-
TEND BEYOND SEVEN YEARS
Schultz v. Kaplan'
This case concerned an unrecorded five year lease re-
newable from term to term at the option of the tenant and
providing for automatic renewal unless notice of termina-
tion was given. Suit was brought to have the lease declared
void under the statute which provides that, "No estate of
inheritance or freehold... or any estate above seven years,
shall pass or take effect unless the deed conveying the same
shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as herein
provided".2 The Court held that the renewal periods
" 153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927).
156 A. (2d) 16 (Md. 1947).
Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 1.
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